

From: "JOHNSON, NICHOLAS L. (NICK) (JSC-SX) (NASA)"  
<nicholas.l.johnson@nasa.gov>  
To: "Wayne R. Frazier" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: RE: 107 debris risk  
Date: Sun, 2 Feb 2003 14:39:19 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Wayne,

I do not have the STS-107 FRR numbers with me (I am at home at the moment). However, I received a message today from JSC/DM that I was designated to lead the OD assessment team on the accident. We will be looking at all possible debris sources, both orbital debris and meteoroids.

Will keep you posted.

Nick

> -----  
> From: Wayne R. Frazier[SMTP:wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov]  
> Sent: Sunday, February 02, 2003 2:29 PM  
> To: JOHNSON, NICHOLAS L. (NICK) (JSC-SX) (NASA)  
> Cc: jlemke@hq.nasa.gov; jlloyd@hq.nasa.gov; mkowales@mail.hq.nasa.gov;  
> wbihner@hq.nasa.gov; whill@hq.nasa.gov  
> Subject: 107 debris risk  
>  
> Nick,  
>  
> I am sure you have already been thinking this, but what were the risk  
> numbers for this profile. I know that some science missions and their  
> orientations drive us to higher chance of on orbit hits. Also, do you  
> know  
> if anything was predicted to be reentering thru the area at the time?  
>  
> We should definitely investigate to cross off the list!  
>  
> W  
> ~~~~~  
> Wayne R. Frazier  
> NASA Headquarters - Code QS  
> Office of Safety and Mission Assurance  
> Washington, DC 20546-0001  
> Ph: 202 358-0588 Fax: 202 358-3104  
> ~~~~~  
>  
> "Mission success starts with safety"  
>

X-Sender: jmullin@mail.hq.nasa.gov  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2  
Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2003 16:14:20 -0500  
To: jlloyd@hq.nasa.gov  
From: "Jonathan B. Mullin" <jmullin@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Fwd: Fw: Columbia follow-up  
Cc: jlemke@hq.nasa.gov, wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov

Jim, thought you might pass this note on. It comes from Mike McCombs at Vandenberg. I am sure that the board is considering all of the possibilities. This note is a bit stale as it was sent to my home computer, and Barb is using it most of the time. Regards, Jon

Sent: Sunday, February 02, 2003 9:36 AM  
Subject: Columbia follow-up

Jon,

I've heard word of debris striking wing on ascent. If they are not already lending some focus to that, consider the "build-paper trail" for that particular ET and go for the foam mixing ratios, mix times and cure times, etc. If you recall the Delta failure in 98 at the Cape, the investigation got to the build-paper for the GEM cases at their manufacturing point; records showed the resins had been cured within spec, but at the upper/lower end of the spec, and coupled with other specs in the mixing, temperature, set-time, etc., the result was a cured product that was more brittle than expected. When the GEM ignited, and "perhaps - not proven, I recall - due to a small flaw in the fibers, the GEM ruptured lengthwise.

It could be a similar situation in that at that point where a shift-change occurred and mix working time was shaky, but someone thought the foam was still workable and application continued, resulting in a less-than-adequate bond and hence a large piece could have been easily dislodged. This would require investigation to see if somehow, somewhere, sometime, an individual made a decision to cut-a-corner to save time or \$, instead of meeting the requirement.

Note I am not saying this is the smoking gun, but this concept is what the Fault Tree Analysis would prove or de-bunk.

Michelle Laufer (working in SES since the late 80s and with Rockwell before that) called me yesterday morning "offering" to support any investigation that might be initiated. I think that goes for all of us.

Bye for now, and good sailing. Try to keep those folks on-track.

Mike

Jonathan B. Mullin  
Manager Operational Safety  
Emergency Preparedness Coordinator  
Headquarters National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Jonathan B. Mullin, 04:14 PM 2/18/2003 -0500, Fwd: Fw: Columbia follow-up

---

Phone (202) 358-0589

FAX (202) 358-3104

"Mission Success Starts with Safety"

09:44 AM 2/26/2003 -0500, MOr e shuttle info

---

To:  
From: "Wayne R. Frazier" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: MOre shuttle info  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
Attached:

<http://spaceflight.nasa.gov/shuttle/>

See A/F images of the orbiter going overhead. Unfortunately, the part of the left wing of interest appears to be in the shadow.

'From: "Cooke, Douglas K., Col, SAF/AQPC" <Douglas.Cooke@pentagon.af.mil>  
To: "'Wayne R. Frazier'" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: RE: Photo from STS107  
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2003 08:24:15 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

everything looks to be where it is supposed to be...there does appear to be a small shadow toward the end of the left-hand leading edge -- appears to be a slight depression; doubt it's anything of concern, however.

I guess for the future, you'll have to increase surveillance on the vehicle as it orbits -- high speed photography; high res radar tracking; thermal imaging... could/should all future missions conduct EVAs once on-orbit and just prior to return to get a visual inspection of the spacecraft? Having said that, there probably isn't much repair capability if external damage is noted???

-----Original Message-----

From: Wayne R. Frazier [mailto:[wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov](mailto:wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov)]  
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2003 8:10 AM  
To: [Keith.Eden@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:Keith.Eden@pentagon.af.mil),  
[Douglas.Cooke@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:Douglas.Cooke@pentagon.af.mil)  
Subject: Fwd: Photo from STS107

Here is a shot of the wings taken on orbit from one of my contacts in JSC. Not much can be determined from this limited shot, but just shows what we're up against getting to the bottom of this.

More to come.

Wayne

>This looks like a large portion of the wing, but it really is not. The  
>photo, of course, was taken from one of the two windows at the front of the  
>cargo bay.

>  
>  
>Nick  
>

From: "Frost, John C SAFETY" <john.frost@us.army.mil>  
To: "'wfrazier@HQ.NASA.GOV'" <wfrazier@HQ.NASA.GOV>  
Subject: High Speed Foam Damage Potential  
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2003 18:17:20 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Wayne,

As we discussed by phone, the Army has recently done some testing that might be of some use to the Columbia investigation.

In short, after years of missile firings without incident, we recently began experiencing significant damage to the tail structures of helicopters firing a specific version of the Hellfire missile. After much investigation, the only change we could find was that the new rocket motor manufacturer had started adding a foam insert inside the rocket motor. However this foam was very soft and light, much like a few ounce "Nerf Ball" and didn't seem capable of damage

to the robust aircraft structures.

To resolve the issue we test fired motors and measured speed, damage, dispersion etc. Bottom line was that even this extremely light weight, low density foam was capable of surprising damage at high speeds. Test results from the redesigned replacement motor are attached. They briefly describe the problem and our test setup. The PDFs entitled 1-Summary and 2-Program have a little background.

I understand that the density and speed of our "foam" is very different than your insulation, but do want to make sure you know what we know. If this phenomenon turns out to be of interest to you, I can put you in touch with our experts that tested the damage potential of the foam.

Good luck on your investigation. Call if we can help on any.

Best Regards,

John C. Frost, P.E.  
Chief, AMCOM Safety Office

-----Original Message-----

From: Mulkey, Bob A SAFETY  
Sent: Wednesday, February 05, 2003 2:29 PM  
To: Frost, John C SAFETY  
Subject: FW: Rocket Motor Report

To: "Cooke, Douglas K., Col, SAF/AQPC" <Douglas.Cooke@pentagon.af.mil>  
From: "Wayne R. Frazier" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: RE: Photo from STS107  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
Attached:

Yea, not much you can do for the thousands of unique tiles. For this mission they could not even do an EVA. The EVA hatch was blocked with a tunnel to the SpacHab module. I am sure we'll take some hits for our lack of on orbit surveillance and repair capability from the board, especially since tile damage has been a problem. At 08:24 AM 2/13/2003 -0500, you wrote:

everything looks to be where it is supposed to be...there does appear to be a small shadow toward the end of the left-hand leading edge -- appears to be a slight depression; doubt it's anything of concern, however.

I guess for the future, you'll have to increase surveillance on the vehicle as it orbits -- high speed photography; high res radar tracking; thermal imaging... could/should all future missions conduct EVAs once on-orbit and just prior to return to get a visual inspection of the spacecraft? Having said that, there probably isn't much repair capability if external damage is noted???

-----Original Message-----

From: Wayne R. Frazier [mailto:[wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov](mailto:wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov)]  
Sent: Thursday, February 13, 2003 8:10 AM  
To: [Keith.Eden@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:Keith.Eden@pentagon.af.mil);  
[Douglas.Cooke@pentagon.af.mil](mailto:Douglas.Cooke@pentagon.af.mil)  
Subject: Fwd: Photo from STS107

Here is a shot of the wings taken on orbit from one of my contacts in JSC. Not much can be determined from this limited shot, but just shows what we're up against getting to the bottom of this.

More to come.  
Wayne

>This looks like a large portion of the wing, but it really is not. The  
>photo, of course, was taken from one of the two windows at the front of the  
>cargo bay.  
>  
>  
>Nick  
>

From:  
To: <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Reply-to: snewman@hq.nasa.gov  
X-your-intranet-is:  
X-for-help-with-Intranets:  
Date: Sat, 01 Feb 2003 22:27:36 GMT  
X-mailer: AspMail 4.0 4.03 (SMT412E7EF)  
Subject: An Invitation from  
X-OriginalArrivalTime: 01 Feb 2003 22:27:37.0296 (UTC)  
FILETIME=[1FADBD00:01C2CA41]

Dear Wayne,

We've set up an intranet for 107 Team and want you to check it out.

Here's a personal message from

Our intranet is our group's private website. We can use it to share group documents, schedule events, hold online discussions, and more. Only people who are invited to join can become members. I've created a temporary login name and password to make it easy for you to access our site.

GETTING STARTED: To become a permanent member, all you have to do is complete your registration when you log in.

To begin, click here:

If you are not interested in participating, you can decline your membership by clicking here:

Dr. J. Steven Newman, 10:27 PM 2/1/2003 +0000, An Invitation from Dr. J. Steven Newm

I hope to see you soon in our intranet!

Regards,

X-Sender: mstamate@mail.hq.nasa.gov  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2  
Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2003 11:11:16 -0500  
To: James Lloyd <jlloyd@hq.nasa.gov>, Wayne R. Frazier <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
From: Michael Stamatelatos <mstamate@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Re: Old shuttle risk study by Pate-Cornell  
Cc: prutledg@hq.nasa.gov, jlemke@hq.nasa.gov, jlyver@hq.nasa.gov

Jim:

I already gave Wayne copies of two papers published by Elizabeth based on that work. I am also getting a copy of the report today and I will forward a copy to you and Wayne.

Michael

At 10:26 AM 2/4/2003 -0500, James Lloyd wrote:

I recall seeing the study and recall it being on workmanship and its relationship to goodness of tile application. The study also treats the risk in a probabilistic sense. Maybe Bill Loewy could do a search on the web if it might be available externally or on the servers if internally. I think it predates Bob Weinstock but I may be wrong unless it was worked through Vitro. I would bet it is somewhere where we might have all the supporting documents for risk assessment.

At 09:58 AM 2/4/2003 -0500, Wayne R. Frazier wrote:

Jack Mannix from legal just called me. They are looking for a 1990 study by Elizabeth Pate-Cornell at Stanford on Shuttle Risk Analysis. I think I remember Bob Weinstock working that from here out of Code Q funds. Does anyone have a copy. Apparently its getting some press.

Wayne

-----  
Wayne R. Frazier  
NASA Headquarters - Code QS  
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance  
Washington, DC 20546-0001  
Ph: 202 358-0588 Fax: 202 358-3104  
-----

"Mission success starts with safety"

Jim

\*\*\*\*\*  
Dr. Michael Stamatelatos  
Manager, Agency Risk Assessment Program  
NASA Headquarters - Mail Code QE  
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance  
300 E Street, SW

Washington, DC 20024  
Phone: 202/358-1668 Fax: 202/358-2778  
E-mail: Michael.G.Stamatelatos@nasa.gov  
(Please note change in e-mail address)

\*\*\*\*\*  
"Mission success starts with safety"

Content-Type: application/x-msexcel; name="STS-107 Comm.xls"  
Content-Description: STS-107 Comm.xls  
Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="STS-107 Comm.xls"

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\*\*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\*  
Jack Lekan John.F.Lekan@nasa.gov  
NASA John H. Glenn Research Center (216) 433-3459 Office  
at Lewis Field (216) 433-3790 Fax  
Mail Stop 77-7  
21000 Brookpark Road  
Cleveland, Ohio 44135  
\*\*\*\*\*  
\*\*\*\*\*

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Ann P. Over/Microgravity Science (216) 433-6535 (Fax 3-8050)  
NASA Glenn Research Center, M.S. 77-5 (Rm. 228)  
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\* \* \* \* \* \* \* ~~~~~ \*

\* \* \* \* \* \* \*

Martha S. Wetherholt  
NASA HQ Code QS

mwetherh@hq.nasa.gov  
(202) 358 - 0470  
(202) 358 - 3104 FAX

~~~~~

\* \* \* \* \* \* \* ~~~~~ \*

\* \* \* \* \*

..., 08:23 AM 2/5/2003 -0500, Columbia

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From:  
To: "Wayne Frazier (E-mail)" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Columbia  
Date: Wed, 5 Feb 2003 08:23:22 -0500  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Did you ever find out if the wheel well was pressurized? I agree with you that it does not need to be. If the compartment is heated, I would think that some level of presurization is required. Do you have any information on the tire? What is the tire pressure and what loads can it take?

Appreciate anything you can provide.

BAE Systems Team  
Stafford Virginia 22554

To: Martha Wetherholt <mwetherh@hq.nasa.gov>  
From: "Wayne R. Frazier" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Re: Fwd: STS-107 Commemorative Shirts  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
Attached:

I am interested in several. At 02:28 PM 2/7/2003 -0500, you wrote:  
FYI:

Just in case you're interested, I just received the (final version) of the order form from the On-Deck company in Florida for STS-107 commemorative shirts. As indicated on the order form, proceeds from this will go to the Astronauts Memorial Fund.

Martha

Anyone here at Code Q interested? I might be willing to coordinate it - next week -- if there is an interest.  
We should pool together if anyone wants one.

Martha

X-Sender: lvover@popserve.grc.nasa.gov  
Date: Thu, 6 Feb 2003 10:09:34 -0500  
To: "Recipient.List.Suppresssed": ;, @nasa.gov  
From: "Ann P. Over" <Ann.P.Over@nasa.gov>  
Subject: STS-107 Commemorative Shirts

Date: Tue, 4 Feb 2003 06:11:38 -0800 (PST)  
From:  
Subject: STS-107 Commemorative  
To:

Many people have asked for a commemorative shirt for the STS-107 mission. Here is an order form, and artist sketch of the design. (It may get some more tweaking)

There will only be two printing deadlines.  
Please share this with your coworkers, and see if there is any interest.  
We look forward to processing your orders.

ON DECK

JOHNSON, NICHOLAS L. (NICK) (JSC-SX) (NASA), 08:05 AM 2/13/2003 -0500, Re: Photo fro

To: "JOHNSON, NICHOLAS L. (NICK) (JSC-SX) (NASA)"  
<nicholas.l.johnson@nasa.gov>  
From: "Wayne R. Frazier" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Re: Photo from STS107  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
Attached:

Thanks,

W

At 07:48 AM 2/12/2003 -0600, you wrote:  
<<sts-107-wingcompare-extra.jpg>>

This looks like a large portion of the wing, but it really is not. The photo, of course, was taken from one of the two windows at the front of the cargo bay.

Nick

03:26 PM 2/6/2003 -0500, Orbiter tires

---

To:  
From: "Wayne R. Frazier" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Orbiter tires  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
Attached:

Talked to our shuttle folks and aviation folks here in our office. Orbiter mains are 315 psi and nose is 300 psi with GN2. Neither thinks that any gear bays are pressurized in military, or civil. Gotta go!

W

Frost, John C SAFETY, 09:32 AM 2/7/2003 -0500, Re: High Speed Foam Damage Potential

To: "Frost, John C SAFETY" <john.frost@us.army.mil>  
From: "Wayne R. Frazier" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Re: High Speed Foam Damage Potential  
Cc:  
Bcc:  
Attached:

thanks JOHN. I will let you know. Space Debris is the current hot topic and I may get all the help I need and more.

W

At 06:17 PM 2/6/2003 -0600, you wrote:

# LANDING SUMMARY STS-107 (OV-102) PAR

## • Orbital Debris / Meteoroid Risk Assessment

Source: Space Science Branch, SNC

- Probability of a maneuver warning is ~1 in 5.7 (1 in 6 is typical)
  - If there is an alarm and no avoidance maneuver is performed, the probability of collision with a catalogued object is estimated to be at least 1 in 100,000.

| Mission Specific                       | Program Acceptance |
|----------------------------------------|--------------------|
| Odds of critical penetration           | 1 in 370           |
| Probability of no critical penetration | 0.9973             |
| Odds of radiator leak                  | 1 in 315           |
| Probability of no radiator leak        | 0.9968             |
| Expected number of window replacements | 2.1                |
| Window replacement risk                | 88%                |

X-Sender: jlloyd@mail.hq.nasa.gov  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2  
Date: Thu, 13 Feb 2003 08:27:12 -0500  
To: salexand@hq.nasa.gov, elvia h thompson <ethompso@mail.hq.nasa.gov>, cac <cac@hq.nasa.gov>, hcat@hq.nasa.gov, jmannix@hq.nasa.gov  
From: James Lloyd <jlloyd@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: ASAP minutes in regard to concerns of MMOD Damage and Mitigating Responses to Threat  
Cc: wfrazier@mail.hq.nasa.gov, jlemke <jlemke@hq.nasa.gov>, prutledge@hq.nasa.gov, mark Kowaleski <mkowales@hq.nasa.gov>, prichard@hq.nasa.gov

Not sure who is now leading the collection of reports that may instigate questions but here is one that is in the public domain and has information on MMOD risks.

<http://www.nap.edu/books/0309059887/html/index.html>

X-Sender: wfrazier@mail.hq.nasa.gov  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2  
Date: Wed, 12 Feb 2003 07:08:52 -0500  
To: James Lloyd <jlloyd@hq.nasa.gov>  
From: "Wayne R. Frazier" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Re: ASAP minutes  
Cc: jlemke@hq.nasa.gov, mkowales@mail.hq.nasa.gov, wbihner@hq.nasa.gov, lsirota@hq.nasa.gov

Yesterday, I received from Nick Johnson a fax of Tommy Holloway's response to the 1997 NRC Report concerning the risk of OD damage to the orbiter. The report chaired by Rick Hauck, former astronaut and now a DC area space insurance executive, is very prophetic when it comes to some of the risk scenarios I have read about in the paper.

<http://www.nap.edu/books/0309059887/html/index.html>

W

At 06:22 PM 2/11/2003 -0500, you wrote:  
Len,

I have excerpted a section from the November 7, 2002 minutes of the open ASAP meeting at Houston. These minutes are on the web site and freely open to public. Buried very carefully in the Aviation Safety section (:>) you can find a reference to the need to do more fact finding on on-orbit repair capability in the face of the enhanced risk of MMOD damage on extended duration stays. This is what the AP reporter wants to interview someone about. Elvia Thompson, PAO, says the reporter is also looking for the NASA response to this. Since it isn't even a recommendation, let alone a report to NASA, I suspect people have not had a chance to even know that this observation/need to fact find even exists. The entire report is 7 pages in

length and is a PDF located at:

[http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/asapmeet/11\\_7\\_2003.pdf](http://www.hq.nasa.gov/office/codeq/asapmeet/11_7_2003.pdf)

Messrs. Goranson and Gutierrez are the ASAP members with the stated interest.

**Aviation Safety**

Mr. Gutierrez discussed the continuing Panel concern about who the Center Aviation Safety Officers report to. The ASAP has consistently taken the position that the ASO should report directly to the Center Directors. NASA does not have a consistent organization across all Centers and does not believe this structure is necessary to have a safe operation. It was agreed that the issue would be closed in the Annual Report with an agreement to disagree.

Mr. Gutierrez also mentioned the SATS program and the no-fly zone concerns as possible issues which would be addressed in the visit to LaRC the following week.

Mr. Goetz noted that Orbital Debris was still an open issue that needed to be addressed. Ms. McCarty wanted the funding status of the JSC capability to be included in the next JSC briefing. Messrs. Goranson and Gutierrez desire more fact-finding about on-orbit vehicle repair techniques and characteristics for extended on-orbit durations.

Mr. Schaufele discussed the common issues of Second Generation launch vehicles, SLI, CRV, CTV and upgrades. The requirements have not been adequately defined, have not considered full lifecycle costs, have not been focused on a long-range NASA vision and have not had adequate focus on safety. The inter-relationship between SLI and CRV/CTV need to be considered as well as the compatibility of the CRV/CTV with EELV's. It was noted that the Integrated Space Transportation Plan, currently under NASA review, would address the requirements of these programs.

Jim

~~~~~  
Wayne R. Frazier  
NASA Headquarters - Code QS  
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance  
Washington, DC 20546-0001  
Ph: 202 358-0588 Fax: 202 358-3104  
~~~~~

*"Mission success starts with safety"*

</x-html>

Jim

X-Authentication-Warning: spinoza.public.hq.nasa.gov: majordom set sender to owner-code-qs using -f  
X-Sender: mkowales@mail.hq.nasa.gov  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2  
Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2003 11:31:24 -0500  
To: code-qe@lists.hq.nasa.gov, code-qs@lists.hq.nasa.gov  
From: Mark Kowaleski <mkowales@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Fwd: crew escape system studies list.ppt  
Cc: Charles.M.Chester@msfc.nasa.gov, Thomas.W.Hartline@msfc.nasa.gov  
Sender: owner-code-qs@lists.hq.nasa.gov

Hi Folks,

This is a question from HCAT:

Does anyone have any of the following:

- **Crew Escape Module Study, Rockwell, 1989**
- **Shuttle Evolution Crew Escape Study, Rockwell, 1991**
- **Access to Space Study, NASA, 1994**
- **Space Transportation Architecture Study, NASA, 1999**

X-Sender: whill@mail.hq.nasa.gov  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2  
Date: Thu, 06 Feb 2003 11:00:02 -0500  
To: Mark Kowaleski <mkowales@hq.nasa.gov>  
From: William Hill <whill@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: crew escape system studies list.ppt

Think Safe, Be Safe  
NASA's New Vision: To improve life here,  
to extend life to there, to find life beyond.  
NASA's new Mission Statement:

To understand and protect our home planet  
To explore the universe and search for life  
To inspire the next generation of explorers  
....as only NASA can.

X-Authentication-Warning: spinoza.public.hq.nasa.gov: majordom set sender to owner-code-q using -f  
X-Sender: gtemplet@mail.hq.nasa.gov  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2  
Date: Tue, 21 Jan 2003 08:24:21 -0500  
To: code-q@lists.hq.nasa.gov  
From: Geoffrey Templeton <gtemplet@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: STS-107  
Sender: owner-code-q@lists.hq.nasa.gov

STS-107 is scheduled for March 1. If you send me names earlier, they will received invitations. If you wish to have anyone else witness the launch, please let me know by January 29, 2003. Remember, I need full names, titles, and occupation of the principal, and the full names of all those in the party. Thanks. Geoff

Geoffrey B. Templeton  
Director, George M. Low Program/CI  
NASA Headquarters, Code Q  
Washington, DC 20546-0001

Phone: 202.358.2157  
Facsimile: 202.358.2779  
E-Mail: gtemplet@hq.nasa.gov

X-Sender: mstamate@mail.hq.nasa.gov  
X-Mailer: QUALCOMM Windows Eudora Version 4.3.2  
Date: Tue, 04 Feb 2003 11:13:52 -0500  
To: "Wayne R. Frazier" <wfrazier@hq.nasa.gov>  
From: Michael Stamatelatos <mstamate@hq.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Re: Old shuttle risk study by Pate-Cornell  
Cc: jlloyd@hq.nasa.gov, prutledg@hq.nasa.gov, jlemke@hq.nasa.gov,  
jlyver@hq.nasa.gov

We talked about this and I gave you copies of two papers Cornell wrote based on it. I should also get later today a copy of the report and I will make you a copy.

At 09:58 AM 2/4/2003 -0500, Wayne R. Frazier wrote:

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Wayne

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Wayne R. Frazier  
NASA Headquarters - Code QS  
Office of Safety and Mission Assurance  
Washington, DC 20546-0001  
Ph: 202 358-0588 Fax: 202 358-3104

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"Mission success starts with safety"

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"Mission success starts with safety"

From: "CURRY, JOHN M. (JSC-DA8) (NASA)" <john.m.curry@nasa.gov>  
To: DL ESAT <DL-ESAT@ems.jsc.nasa.gov>  
Subject: Fairfield, CA video/website  
Date: Sun, 9 Feb 2003 00:43:31 -0600  
X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Here is a very interesting piece of video from Fairfield, CA (a town located just south of the Columbia ground-track between San Francisco and Sacramento). The newsclip says it was taken by a gentleman named [redacted]. I can't find a tracking number for this guy or this video, so unless somebody knows about it already, I will contact the TV station (KRON Channel 4).

If this video turns out to be time synced properly, this could be the earliest evidence of shuttle tile shedding (possibly verification of the Bissinger tile shedding event at around 135336 GMT. The time stamp on the tape says 1351, but I assume that is off since 1351 is still well out over the water.....we'll need to time sync that to UTC). Anyway, we need to get Spencer and Co. to look at it.

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Subject: STS-107 MIT EOC ONBOARD and Digital Video

Date: Mon, 10 Feb 2003 16:41:19 -0600

X-Mailer: Internet Mail Service (5.5.2653.19)

Updated lists. A CD of AMOS and Starfire imagery was delivered to analysis. EOC 2-4-0064 is "5:51am Columbia Shuttle, Fairfield California, Lionel Machado". Sorry for the confusion.

<<STS107GlobalTracking.doc>>

<<STS107DIGITALLIST.doc>> <<STS107DVONBDLIST.doc>>  
<<STS107EOCHANDLIST.doc>> <<STS107MITLIST.doc>>

Jason Fennelly  
Mission Video  
Voice: 281-483-0925



STS107GlobalTracking1.doc



STS107DIGITALLIST2.doc



STS107DVONBDLIST.doc



STS107EOCHANDLIST2.doc



STS107MITLIST2.doc





















# STS-107 Accident Investigation Ground Track and

## Events Summary

Based on the Rev 12.1 Master Time Line

(Baseline, 02/12/03, 09:00 a.m.)

February 12, 2003



boconnor, 08:54 AM 1/13/2003 -0500, Fwd: FW: BSTRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)



[BSTRA-PRA-Charts-111.ppt](#)



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**Space Shuttle SR&QA Office**  
NASA Johnson Space Center, Houston, Texas

|                    |                          |
|--------------------|--------------------------|
| BSTRA PRA Approach | Presenter<br>Roger Boyer |
|                    | Date<br>1/6/03           |
|                    | Page 1                   |

# BSTRA Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)

**STS-107**


## JSC SR&QA

Roger Boyer  
Hugo Martinez  
Tim Schick

## MSFC S&MA

Jim Rogers  
Ken Johnson

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**BSTRA PRA Approach**


Roger Boyer

Date 1/6/03

Page 2

## Success Criteria

- SSME Project Office accepts FOD based on size and mass for each set of fluid lines
  - LOX critical dimensions (based on cleanliness):
    - $800\mu$  particle or larger can clog XXX
    - 0.00023 gm particle or larger can damage
  - LH2 critical dimensions (based on cleanliness):
    - $400\mu$  particle or larger can clog injectors
    - 0.00003 (gm) particle or larger can damage



|                    |                          |
|--------------------|--------------------------|
| BSTRA PRA Approach | Presenter<br>Roger Boyer |
|                    | Date 1/6/03 Page 3       |

## Assumptions

- Mission Relevant Test Ball (MRTB) is 1.75" Ball, S/N 7, no notch
- Assume ~20% of the ball surface area available to release "rafts" or chips to the flow field
- More likely that large islands break into smaller rafts
  - Large rafts released under the cup are more likely to be broken up
  - Rafts are generated from islands



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| BSTRA PRA Approach |             |
|--------------------|-------------|
| Presenter          | Roger Boyer |
| Date               | 1/6/03      |
| Page               | 4           |

## Assumptions

- Ignition is not considered in this assessment
- A raft of greater than 400 microns may not successfully pass through the SSME and will conservatively result in LOCV




## BSTRA PRA Approach

|           |             |
|-----------|-------------|
| Presenter | Roger Boyer |
| Date      | 1/6/03      |

## Approach

- Determine probability of having a crack prior to a mission
- Determine probability for a raft of a given size breaking away
- Determine probability of large raft getting into flow stream
- Take no credit for reduced probability of raft actually imposing damage on the SSMIES




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## BSTRA PRA Approach

|           |             |
|-----------|-------------|
| Presenter | Roger Boyer |
| Date      | 1/6/03      |
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Event

Sequence



Assumed to  
be occur

What is the likelihood that a raft is exposed  
to the flow?

>400 $\mu$   
FOD

What is the likelihood that a raft  
of 400 $\mu$  or larger is released?

Crack  
Frequency

What is the likelihood of having a crack per mission?




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**Binomial Distribution for Crack Occurrence on a Vehicle  
(based on initial subsurface indications)**





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Program

### BSTRA PRA Approach

Crack

Frequency

What is the likelihood of having a crack per mission?

- 1 out of 54 on Vehicle balls has a visible crack.
- 7 out 27 spares has subsurface indications.
- First crack on 1.75" -7 test ball occurred after 145 thermal cycles.
- 128 thermal cycles to date on OV-103, -104, & -105.
- OV-102 has 50 thermal cycles to date.

